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The Webb-Pomerene Act at Home
and Abroad

RICHARD A. SLOAN

For the most prolonged period of time in recent history, American
corporations have been experiencing difficulties in dealing with foreign
economic competition. Consequently, there has been a growing interest in
finding ways to enhance the marketing strength of American firms competing
with foreign firms in foreign markets. This is not the first time concern with
American firms' competitive strength has been articulated; the WebbPomerene Act of 1918 was an attempt by Congress to vitalize American
exporting firms. Since 1918, the Webb-Pomerene Act has been the subject of
disagreement as to its usefulness and effectiveness in achieving its stated goal.
The purpose of this article is to examine the Act's rationale and effectiveness,
as well as a newly emerging issue: the status of export associations, formed
pursuant to the Act, in the light of freeworld antitrust legislation and
enforcement. A determination of that status is important because even if the Act
remains unchanged, American export associations operating under it must still
consider what antitrust issues must be dealt with abroad.
This article is divided into two parts. The first is a discussion of the history
of the Act, the reasons advanced for its enactment, and the Act's performance in
meeting its ends.
The second part of this article will describe briefly some of the antitrust
statutes of member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC), as well
as a study of the recently issued OECD "Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises." This article will also examine the status of Webb associations
under these statutes and guidelines.
HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE ACT
Following World War I, the United States began to develop into a world
industrial and trading power. Many people believed that foreign cartels were
thwarting the growth of American business, which was then largely made up of
relatively small businesses. Pursuant to recommendations made by the newly
formed Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Congress carved an exception out of

the antitrust laws to permit American firms to compete more effectively with
foreign cartels. The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act 2 was the final result of
this legislation. The Act was designed to permit small companies to combine
among themselves to form joint export selling agencies, thereby allowing them
to attain the marketing economies of scale necessary to export profitably and
meet the competition of the powerful European cartels. This exception was
explicitly limited by the caveat in section 2 which prohibited associations from
entering into any agreement which would intentionally enhance or depress
prices in the United States of "commodities of the class exported by. . .the
association, or which substantially lessens competition within the U.S. or
otherwise restrains trade therein."5
Originally, the FTC intended the Act to serve only as a method for firms to
form joint selling agencies. But after a number of attempts to amend the Act
and broaden the realm of permissible activities, the FTC in its "Silver Letter"
issued in 1924, adopted a liberal view and permitted agreements as to price,
terms of credit, information exchange, and any such agreements which may
have been necessary to promote association members' interests abroad.4
Subsequent experience has shown that the typical firm taking advantage of
the Act has been neither small nor weak. Furthermore, very few associations
have been organized in such a manner so as to enable members to achieve
marketing economies of scale. In 1965, 77 percent of the export sales made by
member firms were made in industries in which the eight-firm concentration
ratios exceeded 50 percent of domestic sales. 5 Although the portion of total U.S.
foreign trade involved has never been significant, associations have been formed
and used largely for anticompetitive purposes abroad and, more seriously, at
home. In light of this record, several commentators have recommended either
changing or repealing the Act.
WEBB ASSOCIATIONS AS JOINT SELLING AGENCIES
Over the five year period from 1958-1962, 47 Webb associations were
registered with the FTC6 , but only six of them functioned as joint selling
agencies. Nine other associations functioned both to fix prices and allocate
markets among its members, while five others only fixed prices; obviously, the
function of these fourteen associations was not to achieve marketing economies
of scale and was beyond the spirit of the Webb Act. Three other associations
acted as export brokers-a plainly needless effort due to the existence of a large
number of export brokers who operated without need of any special exemption
from antitrust laws. Also four other associations were formed to negotiate with
U.S. government agencies for the right to sell abroad through U.S. foreign aid
programs.7 The other twenty associations registered during that period had either
never functioned or were inactive. Therefore, of these 47 associations, only the
six joint selling agencies could claim to have achieved any marketing economies
of scale. Each of these six associations were in industries whose markets varied
from high to moderate concentration to tight oligopoly8 , and almost all
members of these associations were very large in absolute terms (most of them
listed among the Fortune 500 largest corporations).
In his study of three of these associations (Sulphur Export Association,
Potash Export Association, Concentrated Phosphate Association), David A.
Larson found that in each there had been a period of at least a few years during
which the association had either been dissolved or had lain dormant. His research

indicated that in every case during the active periods of the association there
had been almost complete price uniformity (via price leadership) and stability
in market share at home and abroad, and that during a hiatus in association
activity, price competition and the volume of sales increased. In each case, the
association was resurrected seemingly in order to restore price and market share
stability in both domestic and export markets. Evidently, competitive behavior
in domestic markets can be traced to the export activities of at least the more
active and successful Webb associations. The price leadership exercised, for
example, by Sulexco was only effective when the export cartel was in operation;
Texas Gulf Sulphur and Freeport Sulphur were unable to control either general
market price or the market shares of Duval or Jefferson Lake, the two smaller
members of the industry, during the six year period between the old and the new
Sulexco. Clearly, since they were the leading world producers of sulphur, none
of the member firms needed the association in order to make exports economically
feasible. What could have compelled them to combine under the WebbPomerene Act? Perhaps they hoped to gain something through a legal cartel
which could not be obtained as safely otherwise: restricted output with
monopoly profits and stable, controlled foreign and domestic markets. Thus
although the Webb-Pomerene Act was intended to give small firms a chance to
compete abroad, its principal use apparently has been to permit open
cartelization in heavily concentrated industries such as the sulphur industry.
The Act specifically states that practices which intentionally enhance or depress
prices of goods sold in the U.S. of the class sold by the association do not fall
within the provided exception to the antitrust laws. The inference of an intention
to exert control over price and other market factors is evidenced by the
reorganization of Sulexco at the moment competition and declining prices began
to develop and their almost immediate disappearance in both foreign and
domestic markets once Sulexco began its new operations.10
The foregoing indicates that the use of the Webb-Pomerene Act, even where
it arguably conforms to the intentions of Congress in 1918, has demonstrated
clearly that the rationale is basically unsound. Cartels, by their very nature,
must comprise a powerful and major portion of the particular industry. All else
held constant, as the number of members in a cartel grows and the degree of
hetereogeneity of their products increases, the more difficult it will be for the
group to agree on any actions to be taken, leading to an increased likelihood of
cheating and finally complete breakdown. Associations such as Sulexco and the
Phosphate Export Association had few members, produced homogeneous
products, and hence were able to control the behavior of their members well
enough to prevent breakdown of the association. A cartel composed of a
sufficiently large number of firms to make an economic impact in a competitive
industry (i.e., low concentration ratio) would be unwieldy and probably could not
be an effective exporting tool. So, in the most meaningful sectors, the formation
of a cartel by firms in highly competitive markets to promote exports would be
unnecessary because of the availability of the services of export brokers, who
have the business connections and expertise that a small company would need to
export its products. In competitive sectors, the cost in time, energy, and money
of setting up an effective sales organization is probably more than a single small
firm or a small group of firms would be willing or able to absorb. Marketing
economies of scale attainable by an association can probably be achieved through
the use of an independent export broker, which would leave all interested firms
free to compete in export markets while avoiding domestic repercussions which

may occur if the cartel is of a magnitude sufficient to exploit its domestic
market power.
Traditional economic theory postulates that cartels are formed by rational
profit maximizers who seek to reap higher profits by establishing monopoly
pricing and restricting output. An organization which succeeds in creating that
kind of cartel is neither the proper tool for promoting exports nor for
combatting the power of the foreign cartels. A cartel which raises price and
restricts output will cause exports to decrease-not increase. And as for the
effect of this kind of cartel upon the balance of trade, total revenues fall as the
cartel sets a price, as all conventional cartels do, in the more elastic portion of
the aggregate demand curve. The most effective way for small firms to combat
the market power of a foreign cartel is to compete with it in price, thereby
increasing the temptations for cartel members to cheat, causing dissension in the
ranks, and leading to the ultimate breakdown of the cartel.
One common characteristic of successful Webb associations is that none of
them deal with a differentiated, non-fungible product. If price-fixing is an
activity firms would normally like to engage in, especially when sanctioned by the
government, why have domestic producers of consumer goods not taken
advantage of the Webb Act in export markets? One reason may be that they have
already successfully cartelized. Another reason may be that with most
differentiated consumer goods, competition is relatively heavy in most major
export markets. Since a cartel is unlikely to be successful when faced with
competition, and since these firms compete less in price than in product
differentiation, overt export cooperation may threaten their continual
development of new, improved, and different products, as well as disturb their
techniques of promotion and marketing. An industry in which success depends
upon trade secrets and promotional strategy is not receptive to the cooperation
necessary to establish joint marketing operations, especially when faced with
meaningful competition in foreign markets. In any case, the sounder strategy for
producers of differentiated goods has been to establish subsidiary companies in
the foreign markets. This approach is desirable because it permits the firms to
sell in foreign markets without having to contend with government-established
trade barriers and without having to deal with the uncertainties of the extent
of the coverage of the Webb-Pomerene Act's antitrust exemption and its
unpredictable enforcement by the FTC.1 2
WEBB ASSOCIATIONS LIMITED TO SETTING
PRICE AND DIVIDING MARKETS
The majority of functioning Webb associations have operated as devices
through which members have set export prices and divided markets. Most
firms participating in these associations have continued to export either on their
own or through export brokers, with only a small percentage of their exports
actually assisted in some way by the association.' 3 Since no evidence has been
presented that members of these associations have been able to increase their
expor ts through use of the Act, arguably these practices should be withdrawn
from the Act's protection. There is no reason to permit this potential source of
domestic collusion to exist. The Act's antitrust exemption was created solely to
increase American exports. It permitted the use of practices which now, if not in
1918, are thought to be inherently dangerous to the domestic economic welfare
by facilitating virtually undetectable tacit or explicit collusion in domestic

markets.' Evidently, no meaningful benefits have accrued or are likely to accrue
to the American economy. The Act's exemption should either be withdrawn or
reshaped to produce the desired result.
When the Federal Trade Commission conducted a detailed survey of these
associations from 1958-1962, members were asked, for the first time, to list
separately the exports directly assisted by the Webb association from all exports
which were not directly assisted. Previous data indicated that Webb associations
accounted for 32 to 5 percent of total U.S. exports; however, the new findings
showed that the correct figure was just over 2 percent.' 5 This figure casts
suspicion on the claim that the Webb-Pomerene Act serves as an export trade
booster. Another indication of the Act's probable failure is that associations are
only being used in a very limited number of products.16 With few exceptions,
the members do not depend upon their respective Webb association for the
facilitation of their exports. Instead, the associations serve principally as
information exchange mechanisms which present the dangerous potential for use
in a manner inconsistent with the kind of free and open competition pursued by
American antitrust policy.
PROPOSALS FOR AMENDING THE ACT
Perhaps if the Act had been better conceived, the results would not have
been so disappointing. Several explanations of the Act's failure to be utilized
properly have been outlined in a report by the Comptroller General, "Clarifying
Webb-Pomerene Act Needed to Help Increase U.S. Exports" (GAO report)
published in 1973. Among the reasons advanced for the Webb-Pomerene's feeble
performance are the fear of concurrent and inconsistent antitrust enforcement, 1
the exclusion from the Act of exports of technology and services, and a general
ignorance of the Act's existence.
The Webb-Pomerene Act has been criticized for not covering the formation
of cartels for the export of technology and services.' The GAO report noted that
the U.S. engineering and construction industries have claimed difficulties in
competing with foreign firms which receive government assistance and are free
to combine to bid for large contracts involving high technology research and
construction projects, such as hydroelectric projects in developing countries.
Typically, governments which solicit bids for such projects do not want to deal
with multiple bids from a single source; they want package deals which can be
more easily assessed and administered. Precluded from forming Webb associations,
American firms argue that they cannot safely band together to offer such package
deals, causing them to fail in competition with foreign consortia. Their argument
loses its strength when one considers the fact that the dangers of antitrust
liability arising out of participation in one-transactionjoint ventures are not very
serious. Such cooperation might be desirable if it were to lead to steady sources
of export income. ' The GAO report states that the Department of Justice has
given clearance to the Department of Commerce (which, incidentally, has the
task of promoting use of the Act) to promote the formation of such temporary
single-transaction joint ventures in South Amnerica. 0 So far, these consortia have
been able to submit bids which are competitive with those of other countries.
Such an approach may offer much better prospects than the Webb Act.
Another proposed change in the Act is to state clearly the pattern of
government enforcement. Presently, the Justice Department and the ETC have
concurrent jurisdiction. The FTC's enforcement has been in the form of

recommendations for change or injunctive relief, while the Justice Department's
enforcement includes the possibility of imposition of criminal sanctions.
Criminal sanctions might be an unfair risk for firms which operate under a
statutory antitrust exemption which has never been the subject of anything
more than a superficial treatment by courts. Yet, when the Sherman and
Clayton acts were young and without the benefit of judicial scrutiny, no special
dispensations were granted to firms whose practice might have been in
violation. Whether a firm's practices will violate the antitrust laws or the WebbPomerene Act is simply one of the many risks of doing business. There is no
compelling argument in favor of altering jurisdiction over the Act as it
presently exists.
Another proposed change in the Act is to limit the size of firms which may
use it.21 Limiting the use of the Act to firms of less than a certain size (as a
function of market share or absolute asset size), would prevent large firms from
using the Act as an instrument to consolidate their position of control in the
industry, as Sulexco and others appear to have done. The worth of this proposal
is dubious because, if the Act had actually been the answer to small firms'
searches for a method to facilitate their exports, they would have resorted to it
long ago. They have not done so on any significant scale. The proposal would,
however, have the beneficial effect of excluding large firms. The probable result
of any such amendment would be to reduce Webb-assisted exports to
inconsequential levels.
In summary, the Act, while capable of amendment, cannot be salvaged in
any meaningful way by any of the proposed changes. The choice then, is either to
live with it as it is now or repeal it. The latter course is undoubtedly the
wiser of the two.
WEBB ASSOCIATIONS AND FOREIGN NATIONAL ANTITRUST LAWS
The belief that an antitrust exemption in export trade is useful in enhancing
a country's export trade generally is shared by other OECD nations. The
exemptions are similar to the Webb-Pomerene Act, although there are significant
differences. For instance, some indicate a less strict view of the need for
competition in the various national economies; many of the practices permitted
under these statutes would, in the U.S., be per se violations of the antitrust
statutes. For the most part, though, the antitrust laws of these countries permit
practices commonly used by Webb associations, such as export cartels.
The antitrust laws of a number of countries, including Austria, Switzerland,
and Belgium, do not mention export cartels.22 In such situations, the only legal
limit upon their activity would be indirectly through other specific antitrust
proscriptions which usually are limited to behavior contrary to governmental
or public interest, stated in very broad terms to allow much flexibility. In the
other European countries, legislation specifically exempting export cartels from
antitrust enforcement usually includes the same caveat as found in the Webb
Act that the cartel must not have negative effects on domestic markets.2 3
Additionally, the definition of an export cartel is generally similar to the
definition in the Webb-Pomerene Act, except for the limitations on what they can
sell. In Germany, however, export cartels are only those combinations in
which participation by the members must be exclusive and obligatory. Voluntary
associations, where firms remain free to export on their own, are not covered by

the act. Other countries do not share the German limitation, but consider any
association, whether obligatory or voluntary, as an export cartel.
The difference between the Webb-Pomerene Act and foreign provisions for
export cartels is that foreign laws often allow the operation of "mixed" cartels.
A mixed cartel is one which, to be effective in its export operation, must have
some anticompetitive impact in the domestic market as well. All of these
countries require that their mixed cartels be registered with the government, and
the burden of justifying the internal impact is upon the parties to the proposed
cartel in order to win government approval.
These policies concerning horizontal price-fixing are relevant to a
consideration of the status of Webb associations in Europe. Only the United
States, of the member countries of OECD, has invoked an absolute ban on
horizontal price-fixing. Some countries have provisions which prosecute pricefixing only if it has some harmful effect on competition, indicating a "rule-ofreason" approach." Other member states will act against horizontal pricefixing only if the power is abused or if it occurs in certain narrowly-defined
sectors of the economy.25 In practice, this limitation does not act as a significant
barrier to price-fixing, and illustrates a more tolerant attitude toward pricefixing compared to the strict per se rules applicable in the United States.
The background and context of the European antitrust exemption for export
cartels differ from those of the Webb-Pomerene Act. The European statutes were
conceived with a built-in allowance for some limited cartel activity. These
countries have historically been amenable to export and other types of cartels;
providing for their continued existence in the formulation of antitrust policy
indicates that they may have been to some degree a positive development. 26
Ironically, when these countries formulated their antitrust policies, the
principal model followed was the antitrust policy of the United States. Since
1918, the Webb-Pomerene Act has been a part of that body of law, indicating at
least a modicum of economic nationalism showing through U.S. statutes. The
antitrust goal of preserving and promoting free and open competition in the
United States seems to be inconsistent with a policy of permitting the formation
of export cartels-as if competitive freedom need be protected only up to the
water's edge. This provision, however, could be reconciled with the historic
economic practices and policies in Europe.
The effectiveness of these European cartels is difficult to ascertain due to the
insufficiency of statistical information, most of it long out of date. That they are
not the potent economic forces perceived by Congress in 1918 is evidenced by
the fact that in the 1958-1962 survey of Webb associations, of the reasons for
dissolution given by eighty of the associations disbanded between 1918 and
1955, only one of them cited the existence of powerful foreign cartels as the
reason. Instead, foreign price competition was the reason most frequently
given.27
The European attitudes towards horizontal price-fixing and export cartels
are much more permissive than the American viewpoint. Consequently, most
Webb associations would not be likely to run into antitrust trouble in Europe.
Most Webb associations, operating only as price-fixers and market dividers,
have not been effective enough in foreign markets to arouse the concern of
foreign antitrust enforcers. Rarely has a "successful" Webb association,
operating as a joint selling agency, aroused considerable concern abroad. After

its reestablishment in 1958, Sulexco stablized prices, and in 1963-1964
succeeded in doubling the world price for sulphur simply by not exporting any
sulphur at all. Needless to say, these actions created widespread alarm in the
world market. The British responded to the situation by permitting the formation
of the Sulphur Buying Consortium, a monopsony acting for all British
purchasers of sulphur. The Consortium proceeded to buy more than one-half of
its requirements from Mexican sources on long-term contracts, by-passing
Sulexco entirely. This "successful" Webb association activity caused the
formation of a countervailing monopsony power, a development whose
consequences Congress in 1918 neither intended nor foresaw. 2 8
Alternatively, the European countries could respond to excessively
monopolistic behavior through their statutes prohibiting the abuse of market
position. Even countries with no specific anticartel provisions could reach the
cartel by finding the existence of abuse and ordering a relief which is usually
injunctive. 29 Consequently, only the most powerful Webb associations would
encounter the possibility of antitrust liability in these countries. Nearly all other
Webb associations have too little impact in foreign markets to be noticed by
foreign antitrust enforcers.
WEBB ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)
In addition to foreign antitrust laws, Webb associations may have to deal
with a different kind of antitrust law and enforcement: the EEC's antitrust
provisions found in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. As with the
antitrust statutes of individual nations, only the more "successful" Webb
associations would seem likely to pose any threat to desired levels of
competition in the Common Market.
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome is similar to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act in that it prohibits combinations which affect trade between member
states, and "which have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the Common Market." Article 85(3), however, provides
for the granting of an exemption from the article if the practice engaged in
serves to improve the production or distribution of goods or the promotion of
technical or economic progress, so long as consumers share fairly in the
benefits of the exempted practice. Article 86 is a provision prohibiting the
abuse of dominant market position, and is analogous to the monopolizing
prohibition in Sherman Act Section 2, and the merger provision in Section 7
of the Clayton Act. Article 86 contains no exemption. Antitrust enforcement
is entrusted to the EEC Commission, which is empowered to initiate
investigations to try cases and grant exemptions to Article 85(1) under
Article 85(3). In the years since the Commission began its antitrust
enforcement activities, approximately thirty cases have been fully adjudicated
(including appeals to the European Court of Justice, the highest court in EEC), of
which only a few have resulted in assessments of money penalties
and other sanctions.
Apparently, Webb associations have never been pursued for violations of
EEC antitrust law, although cartel firms from other non-member nations have
been prosecuted successfully. In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. E.G.
Commission, a firm, chartered in a country outside the EEC, which cartelized
through its wholly-owned subsidiary was found to come within the

jurisdiction of the Commission. The Court held that concerted behavior by a
firm outside the EEC, which manifests itself within, constituted practices
"carried on directly within the Common Market." 32 The Court stated that
since ICI exerted complete control over its subsidiary, the two ought to be
treated as a single entity, the acts of the subsidiary becoming those of the
parent. Later, the Court held, in Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export
SA, 33 that where the parties to the agreement were situated was "no
obstacle to the application of (Art. 85(1) ), so long as the agreement produces
34
its effects in the territory of the Common Market." The cartel's influence
upon trade between member nations must be perceptible to be covered by
Art.-85 (1).35

Webb associations operating as joint export companies are associations
which, by virtue of their structure, have the power to exert a "perceptible
effect" on trade within the EEC, enabling the Commission to find jurisdiction.
Their conduct could be dealt with under Article 86 as abuses of market power.
The other largely ineffective Webb associations could probably not cause
the market disruption necessary for liability to attach to their actions.
Generally, the practices the EEC wishes to prohibit are those which are
injurious to intra-EEC competition and those which contravene the EEC
objective of promoting the progressive ideal of a completely integrated
European economy. Hence, domestic cartels which create entry barriers to
EEC markets (preventing firms from other EEC states from entering) have
been found to fall within Article 85(1). By implication, export cartels causing
similar results, contrary to the goal of community integration, may also be
vulnerable under Article 85(1). Cooperation in extra-EEC trade results at
least in exchanges of cost and price information, which facilitates cooperation,
tacit or otherwise, among cartel members in markets in which they competed
prior to the formation of the export cartel. These spillover effects may reduce
competition, making it difficult for firms from other EEC countries to enter
and compete in a particular country, a result described in the Wallpaper
case 36 as injurious to commerce between Common Market members.
These kinds of internal distortions inevitably retard progress toward economic
integration and aggravate nationalistic and provincial attitudes toward
international competition.
The negative impacts of Webb associations in these instances add further
stress to the conflict between EEC goals and myopic self-interested trading
policies of the member states. Through mechanisms of price discrimination,
market division, or refusals to deal, "successful" Webb associations contribute
to the construction of market barriers, for example, where supply or price
were made more advantageous to some buyers than to others. So far, no EEC
lawsuits have been brought against Webb associations, mainly because of
their failure to effect substantially foreign markets; a well-coordinated,
powerful Webb association will improve significantly the likelihood of the
imposition of an EEC sanction.
WEBB-POMERENE ACT AND THE OECD GUIDELINES
The recent Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterpriseswere issued by
OECD3 7 in response to the sentiments of all of the members in favor of
standards of behavior to which multinationals can conform. The sections on
competition state, in slightly different form but with similar emphasis, the

same prohibitions and objectives found in Articles 85-86 and in the Sherman
and Clayton Acts. Additionally, the Guidelines seek to improve the collection
and dispersal of information relating to the existence and behavior of
multinational enterprises. Improving the availability of data would assist
member countries in assessing the effects of cartel behavior upon their
respective economies and upon the economic performance of OECD nations
collectively. Presently, only the United States and Germany have any detailed
disclosure requirements; more widespread public disclosure in annual reports
of some kind would be a positive change. Antitrust enforcers could probably
achieve their objectives more efficiently, and countries with lax or minimal
antitrust regulation might be influenced to reconsider their policies and
strengthen their statutes.
Section 3 of the Guidelines addresses specifically the problems arising out
of participation by multinationals in export cartels operating in the same
markets as their foreign subsidiaries and affiliates.3 8 This problem arose
in relation to the Sherman and Webb acts in United States v. Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Co.A The court held that the defendants could
not, without violating the Sherman Act, operate jointly-owned subsidiaries
abroad and at the same time operate through a Webb association to divide
world markets so as to insulate all entities involved from competition.
The Webb-Pomerene Act complements the spirit of these Guidelines, by
requiring information disclosure and setting standards of behavior for export
cartels. Indeed, the Sherman and Webb-Pomerene Acts should be interpreted
as serving the interests of free and open world-wide competition more
assertively than the Guidelines. The Guidelines have the weight only of
recommendations made by OECD members to multinationals operating within
their territories; observance of them is voluntary and not legally actionable,
except insofar as they are coterminous with local antitrust policy.
CONCLUSION
When viewed in the long-term, the Webb-Pomerene Act has achieved none
of the goals set for it by Congress, and any proposals for textual change will
not improve the effectiveness of the act. The principal harm flowing from the
conduct exempted from antitrust laws by the Act is that large firms in
concentrated industries, which have no need to cartelize to take advantage
of marketing economies of scale, have transgressed the spirit but have met
the literal requirements of the Act, generating in the process an intolerably
high risk of serious domestic anti-competitive repercussions. The real
potential for further counter-productive behavior is probably the best reason
for the repeal of this Act. American firms have a growing interest in
reconciling some of the statutorily generated confusion existing over how
they may behave in international markets 4 0 Allowing them to resolve this
doubt in their own best interests, by leaving the Webb Act intact, may
aggravate problems of undue concentration, monopolistic profits, and
resistance to innovation. American antitrust policy was engineered to frustrate
the misuse of and concentration of economic power by the formation of
cartels and monopolies. The Webb-Pomerene Act inexcusably serves to
weaken that policy by allowing firms to shield themselves from liability for
otherwise prohibited activities.
The exemptions from foreign antitrust laws for export cartels are also

counterproductive, if for no other reason than that they do nothing to aid in
the evolution of closer economic ties among nations. The EEC is a laudable
attempt to progress toward economic and political integration. Export cartels,
whether or not operating within the Common Market, may still have harmful
effects on the pursuit of this economic integration and should be prohibited.
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6 Larson, David A., "An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act," 13
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of the Webb-Pomerene Act.

8Larson, supra note 5, at 474.
The example of the Sulphur Export Association is perhaps the most dramatic. The association
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among the four, and the domestic price of sulphur began to fall. The two smallest companies
also expanded their export market hsare. With the advent of a serious competitive threat from
new Mexican sources of sulphur, and generally falling prices, the four reorganized Sulexco.
There was no new entry after that, and the prices began to rise once more, both domestically
and abroad.
10Larson, supra note 5, at 493.

" FTC, supra note 4, at 37. "In 1962 over 80% of Webb sales involved consumer goods and
services and industrial raw materials . . . ." But most of these consumer sales involved the sale
of motion picture and television film packages which were by themselves the largest portion
of Webb sales. These goods, however, do not have readily available substitutes (and are
presumably protected by copyright), which makes the fixing of price and terms possible.
The demand for American films and television films in Western Europe, where most of these
exports were made, is very great, and therefore the American firms are arguably in a good
position to use their Webb associations as negotiating agents to exact supracompetitive prices.
12 In

the Comptroller General's report, "Clarifying Webb-Pomerene Act Needed to Help Increase
U.S. Exports" (1973), at 9-10, one of the reasons stated by some businessmen for not forming
a Webb association is a fear of the unpredictable nature of enforcement of the Act.
Associations have been subject in the past to concurrent oversight and enforcement by both
the FTC and the Department of Justice, which frequently have different ideas and policies.
If, however, there really is such a fear, it ought also to have affected all companies who have
joined associations. Firms have not hesitated to take the risk of running afoul of the antitrust
laws for the sake of handsome short-run gain. There is no reason for the thinking to be any
different here: indeed, they have the benefit of a statutory exception which while still
relatively untested in the courts, provides, on its face, a broad area of action within which
most firms should be able to work, if they find it profitable to do so.

'"

'4
'5

For example, some associations have acted as bargaining agent for the members in dealing
with shippers, perhaps succeeding in getting more advantageous rates than if each firm
negotiated on its own.
Socony-Vacuumn Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940).
FTC, supra note 4, at 36. Under this split reporting method, many associations which had
previously reported substantial Webb exports were unable to report that any were Webb-assisted,
since these associations performed no export function.
A 17

16 FTC,

id., at 41,45. In 1962 measurable Webb assistance was provided in only twelve of the
product groups exported by the U.S. In only four instances was the percentage of total U S.
exports assisted by Webb associations greater than 40'. In most cases, the products assisted
are industrial raw materials, or food products. In only one case was a finished consumer
product found to be using the Webb Act in some way for a major part of its exports. See supra
note 10. The other associations dealing in manufactured goods have dealt largely in semifinished)
or highly standardized goods such as cotton gray goods or pencils.

" see supra note 11.
18

id., at 30.

19There

might well be some danger in a situation where the firms continue the relationship
beyond the scope of the particular project for which it was formed. In such a situation,
anticompetitive effects which might arise from a vertically integrated combination of economic
factors are foreclosure, possible elimination of potential competition at different levels of
activity, etc.

21 see

supra note 11 at 13.

21 FTC,

supra note 4, at 77. The Watkins Amendment.

22OECD, Restrictive Business Practices: Comparative Summary of Legislations in Europe and
North America (1964), at 33-35.
23

Id.

1 Id., at 11-15. These countries are Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden,
United Kingdom.
2

Id. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland.

2

How much the export cartels actually contribute to their countries' export trade is, in most
cases, not known. In Germany, however, the available statistics indicated that export cartels,
at least as defined by the German statute, do not appear to account for more than 3%of annual
exports, about the same as Webb associations. OECD, Export Cartels: Report of Committee

on Restrictive Business Practices, 1974, at 55ff. The difference may be only that in the U.S.
there is more concern about any restraint of trade actual or only possible. Therefore,
if a statutory antitrust exemption such as Webb-Pomerene is not only ineffective, but susceptible
to being misused, the concern is to eliminate it and the potential for harm it carries.
27note 4 supra, at 27.
28 Larson,

29

supra note 5, at 491-2.

note 21 supra,at 11-15.

3osee Appendix II infra.
1 I.C.I. Ltd. v. E.C. Commission, 14

July 1972, XVIII Rec. 619; (1972) CMLR 557.

32 Id.
"

Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export SA, 25 November 1971, XVII Rec. 949; (1972)
CMLR 81.

4

Id., at 95.

* Id., at 96.
36

Groupement des Fabricantsde PapiersPeints de Belgique et at. v. E.C. Commission,

CCH Common Market Reporter
* OECD Press Release A(76)20 of

118335.
June 21, 1976.

*"Enterprises should..
(3) refrain from participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening the restrictive
effects of international or domestic cartels or restrictive agreements which
adversely, affect or eliminate competition and which are not generally or specifically
accepted under applicable national or international legislation; . ..

3 92 F.Supp. 947(D.Mass., 1950).
4

"Confusion on Issue of How Antitrust Laws Apply to U.S. Firms Abroad Seen Rising."
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1977.
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